Webster v. Reproductive Health Services

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), was a United States Supreme Court decision on July 3, 1989 that some believe in part compromised Roe v. Wade's protection of abortion. Specifically, it allowed a Missouri law that imposed restrictions on the use of state funds, facilities and employees in performing, assisting with, or counseling on abortions. The Supreme Court thus allowed for states to legislate in an area that had been previously been thought to be forbidden under Roe.

Background of the case
The state of Missouri passed a law which, in its preamble, stated that "the life of each human being begins at conception" and "unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being".

The statute
 * 1) required that all Missouri state laws be interpreted to provide unborn children with rights equal to those enjoyed by other persons, subject to limits imposed by the federal constitution, and federal court rulings;
 * 2) prohibited government-employed doctors from aborting a fetus they believed to be viable;
 * 3) prohibited the use of state employees or facilities to perform or assist abortions, except where the mother's life was in danger; and
 * 4) prohibited the use of public funds, employees, or facilities to "encourage or counsel" a woman to have an abortion, except where her life was in danger.

The Federal District Court struck down the above provisions, and prohibited their enforcement. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which ruled that above provisions violated Roe v. Wade and later Supreme Court decisions. William L. Webster, then Attorney General for the state of Missouri, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. It was argued before the Court on April 26, 1989.

The Supreme Court's decision
The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the lower court, stating that:
 * 1) The court did not need to consider the constitutionality of the law's preamble, as it is not used to justify any abortion regulation otherwise invalid under Roe v. Wade.
 * 2) The prohibitions on the use of public employees, facilities, and funds did not violate any of the Court's abortion decisions, as no affirmative right to the use of state aid for nontherapeutic abortions existed.  The state could allocate resources in favor of childbirth over abortion if it so chose.
 * 3) Provisions requiring testing for viability after 20 weeks of pregnancy were constitutional, but those limiting abortions in the second trimester of pregnancy were unconstitutional.

The concurrences
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia wrote separate concurring opinions. O'Connor claimed that overturning Roe v. Wade in the context of the Webster litigation, where upholding Missouri's law could arguably be squared with Roe, would violate an important principle of judicial restraint. She then explained that she voted to uphold Missouri's law because she did not feel that it would place an undue burden on the right to abortion.

Scalia, who was angered by the refusal of the plurality, especially O'Connor, to overturn Roe v. Wade, wrote a sharp opinion concurring in the judgment. In his concurrence, he argued that the Court should have overturned Roe, rather than attempting to uphold both Roe and the laws at issue, and he attacked O'Connor's justification for declining to overturn Roe.