Policy of deliberate ambiguity

A policy of deliberate ambiguity (also known as a policy of strategic ambiguity) is the practice by a nation of being intentionally ambiguous on certain aspects of its foreign policy or whether it possesses certain weapons of mass destruction. It may be useful if they have contrary foreign and domestic policy goals, or if they want to take advantage of risk aversion to abet a deterrence strategy. Such a policy can be very risky as it may cause misinterpretation of a nation's intentions, leading to actions that run counter to that nation's wishes.

Examples

 * United States
 * Whether it would retaliate from a chemical or biological attack with nuclear weapons; specifically, during the Persian Gulf War.
 * Whether it would defend the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the event of an attack by the People's Republic of China. This policy was intended to discourage both a unilateral declaration of independence by ROC leaders and an invasion of Taiwan by the PRC. The United States has since been much less ambiguous after George W. Bush stated to "do whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan, but has continued to express dissatisfaction over moves towards a unilateral declaration of independence. The US and several other nations have long felt a need to be ambiguous regarding Taiwan; see Foreign relations of the Republic of China.


 * Israel
 * Whether or not it possesses nuclear weapons (see nuclear weapons and Israel and Israel and weapons of mass destruction).


 * Flexible response