Formal epistemology

Formal epistemology is a subdiscipline of epistemology that utilizes formal methods from logic, probability theory and computability theory to elucidate traditional epistemic problems.

Topics
Some of the topics that come under the heading of formal epistemology include:
 * Ampliative inference (including inductive logic);
 * Game theory and decision theory;
 * Algorithmic learning theory (computational epistemology);
 * Formal theories of coherence;
 * Foundations of probability and statistics;
 * Formal approaches to paradoxes of belief and/or action.

History
Though formally oriented epistemologists have been laboring since the emergence of formal logic (if not earlier), only recently have they been organized under a common disciplinary title. This gain in popularity may be attributed to the organization of yearly Formal Epistemology Workshops by Branden Fitelson and Sahotra Sarkar, starting in 2004, and the recent PHILOG-conferences starting in 2002 (The Network for Philosophical Logic and Its Applications) organized by Vincent F. Hendricks.

Contemporary Formal Epistemologists

 * Horacio Arl&oacute;-Costa (epistemic logic, belief revision, conditionals)
 * Luc Bovens (Bayesian epistemology, probability, etc)
 * Darren Bradley (Sleeping Beauty, Doomsday, etc)
 * Samir Chopra (belief revision, physics, etc)
 * John Collins (knowledge, causation, vagueness, etc.)
 * Franz Dietrich (collective decision-making, etc.)
 * Ellery Eells (confirmation, probability)
 * Adam Elga (probabilistic reasoning, laws, etc)
 * Branden Fitelson (confirmation, logic, etc)
 * Malcolm Forster (confirmation, simplicity, causation)
 * Anthony Gillies (belief revision, formal semantics)
 * Alan Hájek (foundations of probability, decision theory, etc.)
 * Joseph Halpern (reasoning about knowledge and uncertainty)
 * Sven Ove Hansson (risk, decision theory, belief revision, deontic logic)
 * Gilbert Harman (epistemology, statistical learning theory, mind and language)
 * Stephan Hartmann (Bayesian epistemology, probability, collective decision-making, etc.)
 * James Hawthorne (confirmation, belief revision, inductive logic, etc)
 * Vincent F. Hendricks (epistemic logic, formal epistemology)
 * Franz Huber (formal epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophical logic)
 * Richard Jeffrey (probabilistic reasoning)
 * James Joyce (decision theory)
 * Kevin T. Kelly (computational epistemology, belief revision, etc)
 * Marion Ledwig (Newcomb's problem)
 * Hannes Leitgeb (belief revision, probability, Bayesianism, etc.)
 * Isaac Levi (belief revision)
 * Patrick Maher (confirmation, inductive logic)
 * David Miller (probability, induction, logic, Popper)
 * Luca Moretti (confirmation, coherence)
 * Daniel Osherson (inductive logic, reasoning, vagueness)
 * Gabriella Pigozzi (belief revision, decision theory)
 * John Pollock (decision theory, reasoning, AI)
 * Darrell Rowbottom (foundations of probabilty, confirmation, philosophy of science, etc.)
 * Wolfgang Spohn (reasoning, probability, causation, philosophy of science, etc)
 * Paul Thorn (direct inference, defeasible reasoning, induction, etc)
 * Peter Vranas (confirmation, deontic logic, time travel, ethics, etc)
 * Gregory Wheeler (statistical reasoning, default logic, etc)
 * Roger White (confirmation, cosmology)
 * Jon Williamson (Bayesianism, probability, causation)
 * Timothy Williamson (knowledge, modality, logic, vagueness, etc)